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Performance audit and the importance of the debate 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to explore the impact of performance audit on public policy. The 
article investigates performance audit reports and the debates they initiate in the public realm. 
The case of Norway is analysed using mixed methods including a questionnaire, mapping and 
categorizing of reports, document studies and interviews. The results show that the 
Norwegian Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) is primarily preoccupied with managerial issues. 
It is nevertheless open to interpretation whether the preoccupation with managerial issues 
primarily implies an efficiency and effectiveness focus or an assessment of compliance to 
managerial standards.  Most reports get moderate attention in the media and in the 
parliamentary control committee. Therefore the direct dialogue with the ministries becomes 
important for the performance audits’ influence. In the public debate the SAI, the ministries 
and the members of parliament base their argumentation in different institutional logics. 
These logics can lead to different interpretations of the control system, laws and regulations 
and hamper the State Audit Institution’s influence. 
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Introduction 
New Public Management (NPM) has in the last 20–30 years modernized the public sector in 
many countries. This development has resulted in an increasingly fragmented and network-
based organization of society (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). In this system evaluation has 
become a prominent feature. Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) are central in this system. 
They use several methods such as financial audits and performance audits that together are 
important for overseeing the use of public money in order to secure democratic 
accountability. In contrast to evaluation, which often serves client interests, performance audit 
is normative and is used to hold the public administration to account. (Arthur et al., 2012). 
Many scholars have nevertheless questioned whether audit actually helps to improve the 
public sector or if it just represents rituals of verification (Power, 1997).  
 
An accountability-relation starts with giving information, continues with a debate and ends 
with consequences from sanctions (Bovens, 2007). In this article the debate and potential 
consequences are in focus. The article attempts to identify what SAIs holds the ministries to 
account for in their performance audits and to assess the reports’ importance for the public 
debate and its possible implications for the public administration and democracy. The public 
discourse apparent in parliamentary institutions, for example in the remarks from the Standing 
Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs in the Norwegian Parliament (the control 
committee), in newspaper articles and in the performance audit reports themselves, will be at 
the centre of attention. 
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Evaluation researchers are preoccupied with the question of impact and the utilization of 
evaluation results, including performance audit (van der Meer, 1999). There are calls for more 
evidence on the subject (Lonsdale et al., 2011). The impact of SAIs is nevertheless not limited 
to their ability to make civil servants comply with their demands. There are other types of 
influence also, not restricted to the use of evaluation results (Kirkhart, 2000). This is relevant 
both for evaluation and audit. Accountability can improve performance through debates that 
lead to shifts in paradigms (Funkhouser, 2011), for example related to how people perceive of 
problems as well as solutions..  
 
In a review of existing research on state audit Lonsdale et al. (2011) found only 14 studies.  In 
these studies, impact was primarily defined as instrumental. Instrumental impact is more 
short-term and easier to measure than conceptual and interactive impact, which is deemed 
harder to grasp since it entails more long-term consequences that might be hard to single out 
(Lonsdale et al. 2011).  
 
This article analyzes the conceptual impact by assessing the message and the importance of 
the performance audits. Conflicting stakeholder values and arguments in the debate are also 
identified. This is important because decisions made are not necessarily evidence driven, but 
the result of persuasive argument (Sullivan, 2011; Hood and Jackson, 1991).  
 
Conceptual impact is addressed by marrying the more structural concept of institutional logics 
with agency-oriented concepts of discourse and argument.  
 
4 
 
The research questions in this article are thus: What is the performance audit’s message? How 
important is this message for public debates? What implications can these debates have for 
the Supreme Audit Institutions’ influence? 
 
The article uses Norway as a case and analyse three different public debates: First, the debate 
between the SAI and the ministries that is available in public reports. The ministries’ reply is 
always included in the final SAI report that is sent to the control committee. Second, the 
members of parliaments’ (MPs) debate in the control committee in Parliament, which is 
available to the public, but less accessible. Third, the media debate, which is the most 
accessible to the public.  
 
The article contributes to theory on policy evaluation and performance audit by illustrating 
how rhetoric is conditioned by and draw on institutional logics. It also contributes to the 
theory on “auditor roles” (Pollitt et al., 1999)  
 
Background 
The SAIs have increased their influence with the prevalence of NPM systems in Western 
European governments the last 20-30 years. Trust in bureaucracy has lessened and there has 
been an increased emphasis on external control (Power, 1997). An institutional form of 
evaluation, called performance audit, has developed in the same period (Lonsdale et al., 2011) 
and is part of this public management accountability apparatus.  
 
Audit institutions conduct performance audits on different governmental levels; as SAIs at the 
national level and local audit institutions at the regional and municipal levels. The mandate in 
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performance audit is to establish whether public policies, programmes, projects or 
organizations have operated with due regard to economy, efficiency, effectiveness and good 
management practice (Pollitt et al., 1999; Nutley et al., 2012). The Norwegian SAI is 
committed to the performance audit goal of obtaining information about results and policy 
outcomes, but the accountability for fairness and equity still remains important (Arthur et al., 
2012). 
 
The parliamentary control committee is the main recipient of the SAI reports. The committee, 
represented by MP’s according to party-strength in Parliament, debates the SAIs reports and 
makes a proposition for Parliament.  
 
Since 2004 the SAI delays the publication of the reports until the control committee has 
received them. The SAI has initiated a more active media strategy and strengthened its 
communication- and information staff as a consequence. 
 
In research  there has been interest in learning processes from and success factors for 
performance audit and evaluation stressing the importance of the compatibility of the opinions 
of the auditor and the auditee (Van der Knaap, 2011; Van Der Meer and Edelenbos, 2006; 
Reichborn- Kjennerud, 2013; Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen, 2011).  Armytage (2011) 
nevertheless questioned whether evaluations for accountability purposes can contribute to 
improvement and learning.  This article focuses on how performance audits, as a type of 
evaluation with a purpose of holding to account, potentially can contribute to change and 
improvements through the debates they trigger (Schmidt, 2008). 
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Theory 
There has been an increasing interest in communicative rationality, deliberative and 
discursive aspects of politics to understand political and administrative institutions 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2004). Many researchers underline how discursive institutionalism 
is successful in explaining change in contrast to rational, historical and sociological 
institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010; Mansbridge et al., 2010). The communicative action of 
Habermas (1984) lies at the core of this idea. The SAIs reports might be a carrier of ideas that 
can spur changes within organizations. But in contrast to an “ideal dialogue situation” ideas 
and discourse are, in this case, also influenced by power relations, where rational actors 
further their own interests.  
 
In this article the ambition is to disentangle the public discourse to see what implications the 
reports might have. An institutional perspective, focusing on institutional logics, is applied in 
addition to a more agency-oriented theory on “auditor-roles”. Both theories are presented 
below. 
 
Institutional logics 
Institutional logics focus on the effects of differentiated institutional logics on individuals and 
organizations. Four different institutional logics are presented here; a state law logic, a 
managerial logic, a professional logic and a democratic logic. An institutional logic is the way 
a particular social world works, the rules of the game. Institutions provide social actors with a 
contingent set of social norms where behavior is not driven by a logic of consequence, but by 
a logic of appropriateness. Logics interpenetrate multiple levels of analysis, and are thus not 
limited to organizations (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; March and Olsen, 1989).  
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“Institutional logic” resembles Bourdieus’ concept of “field” (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008), 
but differs from it in that it is limited to games and rules in institutions, while the concept of 
“field” in Bourdieu’s sense comprises agents’ social positions more broadly (Bourdieu, 1979). 
An institutional logic can comprise several values that together contribute in the construction 
and organizing of an institutional logic. In addition to values, socially constructed, historical 
patterns and practices that individuals organize their life after define an institutional logic 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: p 804).  
 
According to the state law logic the SAI would base its judgments on values of the 
professional bureaucracy, including impartiality and the accountability for fairness and equity 
(Bovens 2007). It represents values of the classic bureaucracy, such as transparency, equality 
and compliance with rules and the law (Weber, 1968). These values were particularly salient 
in the public service from the 1960s and up to the 1980s (Horton, 2006). 
 
The SAI could also bases its judgment on a managerial logic and the NPM ideology that has 
taken the form of the system of management by objectives and results (MBOR) in the 
Norwegian public administration. This includes annual activity plans, letters of allocation, 
government financial regulations and steering dialogues (Lægreid et al., 2006). Managerial 
values became more salient after the 1980s in Norway with the advent of New Public 
Management (Lægreid et al., 2006). These values stress efficiency and effectiveness, 
performance and responsiveness to the public (Hood, 1991) and are embedded in the 
Norwegian control system (MBOR) (Lægreid et al., 2006).  
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Managerial values have been infused in public management. There is a tendency that the 
professionals hybridize and incorporate governing principles linked to these values 
(Kurunmäki, 2004). This is a consequence of a development where civil servants are exposed 
to more diverse accountabilities than before for their managerial and administrative actions 
(Horton, 2006).  
 
The public administration ideally holds a professional logic of serving the citizens as civil 
servants. In the execution of their tasks they are guided by their professional judgement 
(Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006) as well as by the rule of law and loyalty to their minister 
(Jacobsen, 2008). NPM reforms challenge this professionalism as a governing principle. 
Public service reforms in a number of countries have sought to dilute the traditional power of 
professionals and increase managerial power (Horton, 2006). This has allegedly led to 
traditional high levels of trust being replaced by mistrust, rigorous control and audit devices, a 
practice now being questioned by leading political scientists (Fukuyama, 2013). More explicit 
contracts and stronger incentives are often used to bring professionals in concordance with 
policy objectives. At the same time experts defend professional discretion and try to protect 
themselves from these processes (Ferlie and Geraghty, 2005; Power, 1997).  
 
Politicians are assumed to be devoted to a democratic logic and emphasize the supreme value 
of peoples’ needs in their daily lives. They represent ordinary citizens and supersede 
bureaucratic rules and law as well as marked rights (Alford and Friedland, 1985). Their 
mandate is to fight for their voters’ interests. The politicians are being valued for their 
experience with local council problems, their views about issues, how well known they are 
and their ability to make an impact in Parliament. A politician must show continuing respect 
for the concerns of constituents to be re-elected (Rose, 1987). In contrast to the SAI it is 
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legitimate for the politicians to use political arguments to bring other people around to their’ 
positions.  
 
In many respects the logic of the media can be considered part of the democratic logic as it 
often overstates political agendas and scandals. But in this article the media is primarily 
understood as an arena for news and debate that mediates different ideologies (Alford and 
Friedland, 1985). This arena is important to politicians seeking to advance their own career in 
government (Rose, 1987). If it gains their cause politicians will make use of the media to 
score political points.   
 
Auditor roles 
The SAI has an important role in the governmental accountability apparatus. The auditors’ job 
is to provide arguments to a free debate. To retain their legitimacy, they refrain from political 
agendas and produce evidence (Majone, 1989). The auditors produce this evidence in 
different manners, described by Pollitt (1999) through four auditor roles that are present in 
performance audit today. These are: “the judge”, with prime focus on compliance of the 
public bodies with the law; “the public accountant”, focused on transparency of information; 
the “researcher”, with a focus on generating knowledge according to scientific standards, and 
“the management consultant”, focused on contributing to the improvement of the auditee. The 
different roles will all be represented in audit entities, but the prominence of some over others 
will differ (Pollitt et al., 1999; Morin, 2011). The choice of roles will be contingent on the 
individual institution’s historical path dependency and its institutional logic (Hay and 
Wincott, 1998). The arguments the auditors’ use in the debate with stakeholders expose what 
roles they have chosen to play.  
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The four institutional logics described above, and their associated auditor roles, are 
summarized in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1 Institutional logics and their associated auditor roles 
   Institutional logic 
 
 
Auditor role  
State law logic Managerial 
(NPM) logic 
Professional logic Democratic logic 
The judge X    
The public 
accountant 
X    
The researcher   X  
The management 
consultant 
 X   
  
As can be seen from the table, the democratic logic is not accompanied by an auditor role 
because the SAI is not supposed to make political statements. The roles of “judge” and 
“public accountant” are placed under “state law logic” because they are preoccupied with 
compliance and transparency. The “researcher” is positioned under “the professional logic” as 
she provides new information important for the civil servants. The “management consultant” 
is placed under the “managerial logic” preoccupied with efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Based on the theoretical perspectives the auditors are hypothesized to base their arguments on 
the state law logic and on the managerial logic. The auditors will thus primarily play the roles 
of the public accountant or the management consultant in their assessments. 
 
The SAI has an important role in the governmental accountability apparatus and produce 
evidence for decision-makers. It is therefore hypothesized that performance audit plays an 
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important role in the debates in the media and the control committee and that the evidence 
from performance audit convinces the auditees into making changes and improvements. 
 
Methods 
This article is designed as an embedded case study to investigate governmental performance 
audit (Yin, 1992). Norway, that has a recognized performance audit practice in line with 
international standards, is used as a case (ECA, 2010). The study used mixed methods 
(Bryman, 2006). First quantitative assessments of the reports, the MPs’ and the media’s 
interest in them were made. Second, a theoretical selection of two specific performance audits 
was conducted to enable a more in depth explanation of the quantitative assessments 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007).  
 
A database mapping performance audit reports published and followed up by the SAI during 
2000–2011 was established, resulting in 76 reports in total. The database was both used to get 
an overview of issues and concerns in the SAIs reports and to assess their importance in the 
public debate. The occurrence of different types of questions in the performance audit reports 
as well as different types of conclusions was counted. Most reports had several conclusions 
and audit questions. As a consequence the percentages in the tables displayed do not add to 
100 percent. Subsequently the number of remarks in the control committee and the number of 
newspaper articles mentioning performance audits in their title were mapped and counted. 
 
The questionnaire was used to tap into the importance of the reports in the public debate. Only 
the questions pertaining to the media interest were used. The questionnaire was designed 
based on previous research (Pollitt et al., 1999; Power, 1997; Tillema and ter Bogt, 2010; 
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Morin, 2001). Research colleagues, ministry and agency employees as well as one director 
general and two methodology experts from the Norwegian SAI gave second opinions on the 
questionnaire. Inquiries were sent to the public bodies that had experienced performance audit 
between 2005 and 2010. The inquiries did not go further back in time as respondents might 
have problems recollecting the performance audit or could have changed their place of work. 
These risks increase the further back in time you go. The institutions that received inquiries 
were asked to provide the e-mail addresses of employees who had experienced performance 
audit. Inquiries were then sent to the employees explaining the purpose of the study and 
informing them of their rights. Subsequently, a web-based questionnaire was sent to the 
employees.  Reminders were sent out to respondents who had not answered by a certain 
deadline. The questionnaire was designed in such a way that the respondents were asked to 
answer questions pertaining to the particular performance audit(s) they themselves had 
experienced. The number of responses was 353, corresponding to a response rate of 74%.  
 
A theoretical selection of two performance audits was made to illustrate debates that 
performance audits can trigger. The debate in the media is more salient in the first report, and 
the debate in the control committee is most explicit for the second report. The third debate, 
between the SAI and the ministries is present in both reports (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
The reports were chosen from the 76 performance audit reports mapped. The stakeholder’s 
arguments in the debate indicate what institutional logics they use, what roles they play and 
how the reports have influenced them. 
 
In the period the reports were published (2001 - 2005) the Norwegian government was headed 
by a minority coalition including the Christian Democratic Party, the Conservative Party and 
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the Norwegian Liberal Party.The selected reports were addressed to the Ministry of Education 
and Research and the Ministry of Defence respectively.  
 
Relevant documents in the two cases were examined. Senior managers and -civil servants in 
the ministries and agencies involved in these performance audits were interviewed, as well as 
MPs that were in the control committee at the time of the processing of the reports. See table 
2. 
 
Table 2 The reports chosen 
Ministry Performance Audit Report Number of 
committee 
remarks 
Number of 
articles in 
newspapers 
Ministry of 
Education and 
Research 
1. Weaknesses in universities’ 
management systems - Doc. No. 3:3 
(2004–2005) 
1 18 
Ministry of 
Defence 
2. The disposal of real estate, 
buildings and fixed assets in the 
Armed Forces - Doc. No. 3:9 (2004–
2005) 
14 2 
 
Case studies were used because the research question investigates “how” performance audit 
can contribute in debates and have influence (Yin, 1992). 
 
Results: The message in performance audits and their importance to the 
debate  
As can be seen from tables 3 and 4 (based on queries to the database) and 5 (based on data 
from the questionnaire) the SAIs reports get moderate attention. More than half of the reports 
were commented only in 1–2 newspaper articles and over 60 percent of the reports only 
received 1–2 remarks in the control committee. More than 40 percent answered that the media 
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was interested in the reports to a little or very little extent. Few reports were mentioned in 
newspaper articles and only 7 percent of the reports received great interest from the control 
committee. 
 
Table 3 Percentage of performance audit reports (N=76) mentioned in the newspapers 
by number of articles  
Number of articles Percentage of reports 
0–2 50 
3–9 42 
10 articles or more 8 
Total 100 
 
Table 4 Percentage of performance audit reports (N=76) mentioned in the committee 
proposal by number of remarks in the proposal  
Number of remarks Percentage of reports 
1–2 62 
3–9 31 
10 remarks or more 7 
Total 100 
 
Table 5. Media interest. Percent. (N=353) 
 To what extent did the media show an interest 
To a large or very large extent 34 
Neither large nor little 24 
To a little or very little extent 42 
Total 100 
 
15 
 
As illustrated in table 5 one third of the reports got a lot of attention, but the large majority got 
moderate to little attention in the media and therefore did not set the agenda in public debates. 
The SAI’s direct contact with the ministries therefore becomes important for their impact. In 
tables 6 and 7 below there is an overview of the main issues and concerns raised in these 
reports. 
 
Table 6. Audit questions in the report (N=76) 
Audit questions in the report concerning: Percent 
Operations/processes 80% 
Whether results were obtained 62% 
Whether the ministry followed up the subordinate entities well enough 25% 
Regarding explanations 24% 
Whether laws, instructions, standards and quality assurance systems were 
complied with 
17% 
 
As can be seen from table 6 the most important questions asked in the 76 performance audit 
reports concerned operations/processes (80 percent) and whether results were obtained (62 
percent). Most of the reports asking whether results were obtained also included audit 
questions concerning operations/processes (70 percent). This indicates that most of the reports 
were goal-oriented, focusing on managerial issues, asking questions both about substance and 
systems at the same time (Pollitt et al., 1999; Grahm-Haga, 2006). Questions on compliance 
more linked to values of the classic bureaucracy were less common (17 percent). 
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Table 7. Conclusions in the report (N=76) 
Conclusions in the report Percent 
The goal-attainment, management and control were unsatisfactory 75% 
There was incomplete or not relevant management information 50% 
There was non-compliance to laws, standards and procedures 40% 
There were deficiencies in the design of objectives, performance requirements 
and performance indicators 
38% 
There were deficiencies in the ministries guidance and following up of 
subordinate entities 
29% 
There was lack of coordination 24% 
There was lack of equal treatment 21% 
 
More than half of the reports presented 2–4 different conclusions in the same report. A 
majority of the reports concluded on managerial issues. As can be seen from table 7 three 
quarters of the reports concluded that the goal attainment, management and control were 
unsatisfactory. In half of the reports the SAI concluded that there was incomplete or not 
relevant management information.  
 
40 percent of the reports concluded with non-compliance to laws, standards and procedures 
that refer to typical values of the classic bureaucracy. These compliance oriented reports did 
not exclusively focus on compliance (Grönlund et al., 2011; Pollitt et al., 1999). Almost all of 
them also concerned deficiencies in the design of objectives, performance requirements and 
performance indicators. Two thirds of these reports additionally concluded that the goal 
attainment, management and control were unsatisfactory and that there was incomplete or not 
relevant management information. The compliance oriented reports therefore also focused on 
managerial issues.  
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Approximately 20–30 percent of the 76 reports concluded on lack of coordination, lack of 
equal treatment and deficiencies in the ministries’ guidance and following up of subordinate 
entities. Less common conclusions, not included in table 7, dealt with insufficient 
information, unrealistic planning, lack of competence and insufficient allocation of 
responsibilities. 
 
The case examples: The debates and their potential implications for the 
SAIs influence 
Below, the two selected reports are presented. The case-data is structured according to the 
debates; first there is the debate between the SAI and the ministries, second there is the 
political debate and third the media debate is presented. 
The SAI’s and the ministries’ debate 
The description of this debate is based on a review of central documents and interviews with 
civil servants.  
 
The first report on the universities’ management systems raises questions about 
operations/processes, like 80 percent of the SAIs reports do, and concludes with deficiencies, 
as 75 percent of the reports do, cf. tables 6 and 7. This report is system-oriented. Summa 
(1999) makes a distinction between system-oriented and substantive audits. System-oriented 
audits refer to auditing the control or steering system instead of directly investigating the 
activity itself. The system-oriented approach will typically be more focused on compliance as 
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the auditor checks an organization’s documentation or practice with certain standards (Pollitt 
and Mul, 1999).  
 
The second report on disposal of real estate, buildings and fixed assets in the Armed Forces 
raises questions about compliance to laws and instructions, like 17 percent of the SAIs reports 
do, and conclude with deficiencies, as in 40 percent of the reports, cf. tables 6 and 7.  
Weaknesses in universities’ management  
In the report on the universities’ management systems the SAI investigated how the 
universities in Norway used the measurement by objectives and results system (MBOR). The 
auditors did this primarily by going through documents and interviewing staff. The SAI found 
the leader’s goals and responsibilities to be poorly specified. Management and control in the 
universities was informal rather than formalized and documented. The SAI concluded that the 
planning, implementation and control of the MBOR system was not good enough.  
 
During the audit the university sector was in the middle of a reorganization of their 
administrative and academic systems. In its answer to the SAI, the ministry wrote that it 
should have taken this reform into account in its assessment. Also, it wanted the SAI to be 
explicit about its interpretation of MBOR in the university sector, especially pertaining to the 
role of the university boards. The ministry contested the SAI’s critique of informal 
management and control and claimed that dialogue was supportive of the formal management 
system. The ministry was critical towards the methods and the scope of the SAI. Still the 
ministry wrote that it would consider the information in the report and use it in the ongoing 
implementation of the reform. 
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The universities did not experience the report as relevant. As expressed by one of the 
directors: 
The report was too simplistic and it came at the wrong point in time. Other things had 
to be sorted out first and we were more preoccupied with the quality of our work than 
documenting it. 
 
We have implemented a quality assurance system (…) but it did not come as a 
consequence of this report. 
 
Even though the ministry claimed that the report did not lead to changes it acknowledged that 
the attention from the SAI might have made them speed up the work in implementing the new 
financial regulations in the sector.  
 
The disposal of real estate, buildings and fixed assets in the Armed Forces 
In a government white paper the Armed Forces had been instructed to dispose of property in 
order to save money on operations. This was to be done to the economically most 
advantageous price. A directive was given that presupposed a comprehensive plan for the job 
of selling the properties. In its report the SAI claimed only to identify regional, but no 
national plans for the sales. In some cases regional plans or approval for existing plans were 
also lacking. The SAI did not identify any signals from the ministry to the agency on how to 
safeguard property of special or general interest to the public as presupposed by the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee of Energy and the Environment. Neither had the agency 
identified properties, prior to the sales, that might have been interesting for the public. For 
some of the sales the properties lacked valuation prices. 
 
The ministry objected that the planning system had worked as presupposed, even though it 
acknowledged that there was room for improvements. It claimed that the Armed Forces had 
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taken public interest into account in protection plans and in cooperation with counties and 
municipalities. The ministry also claimed that an estimated property price from a broker was 
sufficient and that a valuation price from an appraiser was not mandatory for the sales. The 
ministry still acknowledged that some operations in the sales process could preferably be 
improved. 
 
Even though initially disagreeing to the SAIs assessments, the ministry was positive to the 
report in the aftermath of events. It considered the report as an aid in controlling subordinate 
agencies and implemented all the required changes. The leader explained: 
The SAI influenced the design of our letters of allocation. It was not problematic. We 
rather considered it an aid. Previously the agency had been selling of the objects with 
the best income potential. Now we could focus on the objects that were harder to sell. 
 
The Armed Forces was at first traumatized, vulnerable and defensive because of the report, 
but decided at a certain point in time to acknowledge the critique and make the required 
changes. The consequences of the report were serious for the agency. In the aftermath of the 
publication of the report leaders lost their jobs and the agency lost its authority to sell property 
without consulting the government first. In retrospect the agency considered the loss of 
leaders an advantage as this made it easier for the agency to make the required changes in the 
organization, not having to defend prior decisions. Making the required changes reduced the 
negative focus on the organization and improved their work situation.  
 
The political debate 
In order to identify the political debate in the two selected cases interviews with four MPs 
were conducted and the remarks in the control committee and in Parliament were analyzed. 
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As demonstrated in table 4, and exemplified by the report on the disposal of real property in 
the Armed Forces, the MPs were especially interested in a few reports and relatively 
disinterested in the rest.  
Weaknesses in universities’ management systems  
A unison control committee and the Parliament only made one remark each to the report. It 
was emphasized that the report considered procedures and not effects of the new system, and 
that the sector was in a reorganizing process that would take time. The committee expected 
continuing formalizations of routines and responsibilities. It also expected the ministry to 
keep the control committee informed on the effects of the reform. 
 
According to the interviewed MPs the SAIs reports were, at times, more critical than justified 
by the Parliament’s decisions and assumptions. In this case the control committee deemed 
information about results of the reform to be more important than the processes that the report 
actually concluded on. 
 
The disposal of real estate, buildings and fixed assets in the Armed Forces  
This performance audit was conducted on demand from the Parliament. Fourteen remarks 
were made by different political constellations in the control committee and twelve were 
made in Parliament. Representatives from the parties in Government supported, in six of the 
remarks, the ministry’s interpretation of the instruction and claimed it had taken sufficient 
account of the publics’ need for recreational areas. The majority of the committee, on the 
other hand, contended that this was not the case; that instructions had not been respected and 
that the consideration for public recreational areas had not been adequately safeguarded. The 
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debate continued in Parliament. Ten remarks were made in the Parliament and the minister 
had to explain herself twice. She warned that presenting each sale of Armed Forces property 
for the King in council, prior to making a decision, would slow down the pace of the sale 
process that was a politically prioritized task in order to cut operating expenses in the Armed 
Forces.  
 
As exemplified in this case the SAI reports can be used as political tools, especially by the 
opposition. The MPs agreed or disagreed with the SAI conclusions depending on their own 
political standpoints, the right-wing being more in favor of privatization and local self-
government while the political left was more in favor of regulation, public ownership, 
protecting the environment and public access to recreational areas. According to the MPs both 
politicians and bureaucrats use the reports to back their own arguments in this way (Bovens, 
2007).  
 
The media debate  
As table 5 illustrated, the media was moderately interested in the performance audit reports of 
the SAI. The pattern shown in table 3 demonstrates that they are especially interested in a few 
reports, but disinterested in the large bulk of them. The case on the universities’ management 
systems exemplifies a debate that got relatively much attention in the newspapers. 
Weaknesses in the universities’ management  
The debate in the newspapers, ensuing the publication of the report, centered around the 
MBOR system. In the report the SAI had criticized the ministry for lack of management and 
control. It claimed that the control was informal, that short term objectives were absent and 
that leaders lacked clear instructions. Researchers and critics of the SAI objected to this 
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perspective and underlined the importance of academic freedom including freedom for 
research teams to define their own research agenda. They pinpointed that there is a risk for 
control systems to twist behavior and trigger less efficiency and effectiveness as well as more 
rigid and bureaucratic practice. The role of the SAI was questioned for being political. It was 
argued that the SAI did not provide undisputable facts. Other articles demanded more control 
from the SAI because museums and universities in Norway have been organized under boards 
or as foundations. The argument was that better control is needed to secure sufficient control 
with the use of the taxpayers’ money.  
 
In interviews with civil servants in the ministry it became clear that there is an ongoing 
dispute between the SAI and the ministry’s civil servants. The ministry claimed that it is the 
board’s responsibility how the universities are controlled, whereas the SAI placed the 
responsibility upon the ministry.  
 
The disposal of real estate, buildings and fixed assets in the Armed Forces 
The debate in the newspapers centered around the rules of the disposal of public property. 
There were allegations of several properties that had been sold without a valuation price and 
without being advertised in the marketplace. In interviews the respondents explained that the 
whole process of the agency’s sale of Armed Forces property became politicized. The debate 
started even before the performance audit report was initiated, with the sale of a unique island 
(Østre Bolærne) to a private religious organization (Smiths venner). The property had been 
sold to the highest bidder according to the rules. Protesters still raised their voices and 
objected to the privatization of the island. This soon became a political issue with the left-
wing politicians advocating and environmental organizations acting against the sale. 
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Discussion 
First the message of performance audit is discussed. Then its importance to the public debate 
and possible implications for the SAIs influence are assessed. 
The message of performance audit 
The analysis demonstrates that a large majority of the 76 reports analyzed contained questions 
typical to the managerial logic such as operations/processes and results. About one fifth 
concerned compatibility to laws, instructions etc., which are values important in the state law 
logic. The SAI’s conclusions demonstrated the same pattern of supremacy of the managerial 
logic. Three quarters of the reports concerned unsatisfactory goal-attainment, management 
and control. Half of the reports concluded on incomplete or not relevant management 
information and quite many concluded on deficiencies in the design of objectives, 
performance requirements and indicators. The predominance of managerial argumentation in 
the reports indicates that the SAI predominantly aspires for the auditor role as management 
consultant in performance audit. In addition, one quarter of the audit questions explicitly 
concerned explanations indicating that the researcher role of providing new information 
characterizes the way the auditors work.  Only one fifth of the questions and less than half of 
the conclusions concerned questions of compliance to standards and procedures. It therefore 
seems that the auditors aspire less for the role as public accountant than hypothesized initially. 
It mostly plays the role of management consultant. The first hypothesis is therefore only 
partly corroborated. 
 
The importance of performance audit in the public debate and possible implications 
As data both from the questionnaire and the database demonstrated the SAI’s performance 
audits get moderate attention in the media and in the control committee. The hypothesis that 
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performance audit plays an important role in Parliament and media debates therefore has to be 
refuted. One implication from this is that the direct dialogue between the SAI and the 
ministries becomes important.  
 
In an “ideal” dialogue situation the “best argument” can potentially persuade stakeholders to 
make changes (Habermas, 1984). As the cases demonstrated the proponents argue according 
to different institutional logics. As exemplified in the first case on the management of the 
universities this can hinder good communication and reduce the SAI’s impact (Reichborn- 
Kjennerud, 2013). On the other hand the control committees’ reaction can become important 
and may be effective in making the ministries implement changes, despite disagreements. 
This was illustrated in the second case were the ministry was forced to make changes 
(Mansbridge et al., 2010).The second hypothesis that the evidence from performance audit 
convinces the auditees into making changes and improvements can therefore only partly be 
confirmed because the influence will be contingent on the argument and the support it gets in 
the ministry and in the control committee. 
 
In the first case the auditors checked whether the universities’ practice complied with their 
own understanding of the MBOR system. In this report auditors did not find and discuss new 
knowledge as the researcher would do. Neither were they primarily preoccupied with 
transparency like the public accountant would be or with providing management advice, like 
the management consultant would do. Instead the auditors checked auditee compliance with 
management systems and standards. The case is hard to classify, but may represent a fifth role 
of “management accountant” that can complement Pollitt’s et al (1999) four audit roles .  The 
predominance of managerial argumentation in the majority of the reports (table 6 and 7) is 
thus not sufficient evidence that the SAIs play the role as management consultant. If the 
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auditors’ preoccupation with the workings of the control system, processes and results 
primarily means that they check how certain managerial standards are complied with the 
reports do not necessarily contribute to increased efficiency and effectiveness. Compliance to 
systems are not necessarily equivalent with improvements in results (Put, 2011).  
 
In the media debate, after the publication of the performance audit reports on the universities, 
critics of the SAI used the professional logic and advocated that researchers in the university 
system should not be subject to detailed control, the argument being that researchers must 
have freedom and leeway in their work claiming that professional discretion is more effective 
than managerial control. Others used the managerial logic and claimed that universities should 
be controlled more as they enjoy more organizational autonomy than have previously been the 
case. The debate in the newspapers thus concerned the control system per se and how it 
should be practiced (Bovens et al., 2008).  
 
The control committee used the managerial logic in its assessment of the report. The debate 
indicates that the MP’s were personally more preoccupied with information on results than on 
compliance with system requirements. A meta-debate on the role of the SAI was thus present 
denouncing the SAI’s preoccupation with procedures. In its answer to the SAI the ministry 
tried to debate the interpretation and the practicing of the MBOR system rather than 
responding to the allegations of inadequate management and control of the managerial logic. 
These arguments, as well as the university director’s statement that no changes were made 
after the performance audit, indicate that the SAIs influence was low in this case. It did not 
succeed in persuading its audience.  
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Even though both the ministries and the SAI adhere to the managerial logic there are 
differences in how the practicing of the MBOR system is interpreted. The SAI typically 
demands more detailed control and the ministry, in accordance with the professional logic, 
demands more leeway for managers to choose how to perform their tasks (Hood, 1991). The 
ministry’s arguments seemed to resonate most with the MPs that did not pressure the ministry 
to obtain changes. 
 
This was different in the case on the Armed Forces where the pressure from the control 
committee was strong. According to the state law logic and the auditor role as judge, the 
Armed Forces report mainly focused on compliance with the law and instructions. The 
opposition was critical, while the Conservative and Liberal party representatives defended the 
agency’s interpretation. Beneath lay nevertheless the democratic logic. Left-wing politicians 
and activists were concerned with the peoples’ access to public recreational areas. They 
preferred to keep the agency public and committed to public rules and regulations. The 
conservative and liberal politicians, on the other hand, were preoccupied with applying 
“business” or public interest principles to obtain a good price and would prefer to privatize the 
agency, as a long term strategy. This was a clash of interests and ideologies and mirror 
political values. The democratic logic staged a discussion between the safeguarding of public 
recreational areas versus economy and efficiency arguments. A concern was also the 
autonomy of the agency. 
 
In the debates, the state law logic dominated in the SAIs argumentation whereas the ministries 
argued according to the professional logic. Both used argumentation pertaining to managerial 
values, the ministries emphasizing the importance of letting local managers exercise their 
professional discretion and the SAI arguing for the need for control (Hood, 1991). In the 
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newspaper articles and in the control committee the democratic logic came to the forefront of 
the attention. When political values were at stake the opposition forced the ministry and the 
agency to comply even though they initially disagreed.  
 
These debates are important in assessing the SAIs influence. The university case demonstrates 
how an evaluation or audit may be refuted if it is not able to make effective connections with 
the way in which the ministries make sense of the world. The Armed forces case illustrates 
how policy makers may draw on SAI  reports when they serve a particular policy 
circumstance (Hood and Jackson, 1991: , p506; Sullivan, 2011). 
Conclusions 
The SAIs performance audits are primarily concerned with operations and results. This may 
imply an efficiency and effectiveness focus, but could also mean that it primarily assesses 
compliance to managerial standards.  
 
The message in the reports relates to administrative and organizational questions, but may, 
even if this seldom is the case, trigger political and ideological debates. When performance 
audit triggers debates its influence will be contingent on whether the arguments resonate or 
conflict with stakeholders’ values and ideas (Hood and Jackson, 1991).  
 
In the debates, both in the media and in the control committee, value questions come to the 
forefront of the attention. The control committee can both reinforce and diminish the critique 
of the SAI and when the government is in minority it can be pressured to comply with 
majority interests. 
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Research that investigates the influence of audit is important (Reichborn- Kjennerud, 2013). 
Analyzing performance audit as a debate contributes in understanding how and when the SAI 
influences its auditees. The findings in this study demonstrate that both the issues, how they 
are presented and how they are interpreted, matter for the potential acceptance of the SAIs 
assessments and thus its influence.   
 
The article contributes to research on the conceptual and interactive impact of performance 
audit. It is also relevant for accountability oriented evaluations as it explores political and 
discursive aspects in the perception and use of evaluations for accountability (Armytage, 
2011). The article illustrates how institutional logics influence what role auditors decide to 
play and what arguments they use. It demonstrates how the force of the better argument is the 
link to action and change. This is interesting to institutional theorists that struggle to explain 
institutional change (Fagerberg, 2005).  
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